Volume 33
Issue 1 Volume 33 Issue 1

Article 2

3-24-2022

The SEC's Ice-Cold Take on Climate Disclosure: Is the 2010
Interpretive Climate Guidance Working?
Patrick Dunbar

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business
Organizations Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Organizations Law Commons, and the
Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Patrick Dunbar, The SEC's Ice-Cold Take on Climate Disclosure: Is the 2010 Interpretive Climate Guidance
Working?, 33 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 37 (2022).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol33/iss1/2

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Environmental Law Journal by an authorized
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Dunbar: The SEC's Ice-Cold Take on Climate Disclosure: Is the 2010 Interp

THE SEC’S ICE-COLD TAKE ON CLIMATE DISCLOSURE:
IS THE 2010 INTERPRETIVE CLIMATE
GUIDANCE WORKING?
I. INTRODUCTION: THE HEATED DISCUSSION
DISCLOSURE

ON

CLIMATE

In his opening remarks at the 2018 Austrian World Summit,
António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, made a
disturbing declaration — climate change represents an “existential
threat” for all life on earth, especially humankind.1 Guterres’s remarks presented the stark reality of climate change while serving as
an appeal to his international audience for increased global climate
action.2 From dramatically rising sea levels to natural disasters, the
relentless forces of climate change will likely require the conjoined
effort of government, business, and community to bring this existential threat to an end.3
Although environmental agencies, scientific coalitions, and
green-minded entrepreneurs often get credit for leading the
charge against climate change, an unexpected actor also belongs in
this category: securities regulators.4 Tasked with ensuring function1. United Nations, Climate Change: An ‘Existential Threat’ to Humanity, UN Chief
Warns Global Summit, UN NEWS (May 15, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/
2018/05/1009782 (discussing Secretary-General’s remarks at summit).
2. Id. (requesting help from financial community and local governments).
3. See U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 12-13 (D.J. Wuebbles et al. eds., 2017), https://science
2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_PRINT_Executive_Summary.pdf
(summarizing Fourth National Climate Assessment report); Andrew Steer, Business
and Government Must Come Together for Strong Climate Action, WORLD RES. INST. (Nov.
20, 2013), https://www.wri.org/insights/business-and-government-must-come-together-strong-climate-action (suggesting both private and public entities must support climate action).
4. See, e.g., Laura Millan Lombrana et al., How Europe’s Small Businesses Are
Fighting Climate Change, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2020, 7:29 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-21/how-europe-s-small-businessesare-fighting-climate-change (discussing business initiatives to fund climate plans
for small and medium-sized businesses); see also What EPA Is Doing About Climate
Change, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 21, 2016), https://19january2017snapshot.
epa.gov/climatechange/what-epa-doing-about-climate-change_.html (providing
background on Environmental Protection Agency’s climate change efforts); The
Coalition, CLIMATE & CLEAN AIR COAL., https://www.ccacoalition.org/en/content/
coalition (last visited Jan. 9, 2021) (describing international coalition of scientific
institutions and businesses dedicated to protecting climate). Securities regulators
are “[r]egulatory bodies . . . established by governments or other organizations to
oversee the functioning and fairness of financial markets and the firms that engage
in financial activity.” Michael Schmidt, Financial Regulators: Who They Are and What
They Do, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/eco
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ing markets, securities regulators across the globe wield immense
power in their ability to provide investors with important information on a company’s overall health — a power that could help direct more capital toward companies resilient to climate change.5
Despite the potential use of regulatory power to combat climate
change, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) does not mandate comprehensive climate disclosure requirements that would provide investors with material information relating to the impact of climate on an investment.6 Instead, a 2010
interpretive release governs the SEC’s climate disclosure policy — a
policy many claim to be ineffective.7 Months after the SEC’s 2020
amendments to modernize Regulation S-K — an update that refrained from providing concrete climate disclosure guidance — the
question becomes whether the SEC should play a larger role in
combating climate change by implementing mandatory disclosure
requirements.8
This Comment examines the SEC’s 2010 interpretive climate
guidance and its effectiveness in producing materially important
climate disclosure.9 Section II provides background on both the
materiality requirement for securities disclosure and the 2010 guidance.10 Section III evaluates the 2010 guidance’s effectiveness in
producing material climate disclosure.11 Section IV examines the
nomics/09/financial-regulatory-body.asp#:~:text=the%20SEC%20consists%20of
%20five,among%20different%20levels%20of%20government (describing role of
securities regulators).
5. See Mark Dwortzan, Can Financial Disclosure of Climate Risk Accelerate Climate
Action?, MIT NEWS (Apr. 16, 2020), https://news.mit.edu/2020/can-financial-disclosure-climate-risk-accelerate-climate-action-0416 (suggesting financial disclosure
can redirect capital to fight climate change). See generally Schmidt, supra note 4
(overviewing U.S. financial regulators and individual mandates).
6. See Public Statement by Allison Herren Lee, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, “Modernizing” Regulation S-K: Ignoring the Elephant in the Room (Jan.
30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-mda-2020-01-30 (suggesting current mandate is ineffective).
7. See id. (highlighting failure of 2010 guidance); see also Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6295-97
(Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter SEC Guidance] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211,
231, 241) (summarizing SEC guidance regarding climate disclosure).
8. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule Amendments to Modernize Disclosures of Business, Legal Proceedings, and Risk Factors
Under Regulation S-K (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/
2020-192 (adopting rule amendments).
9. For a discussion of the effectiveness of the SEC’s 2010 guidance, see infra
notes 117-59 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the SEC, the materiality standard, and the 2010 guidance, see infra notes 14-116 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the effectiveness of the SEC’s 2010 guidance, see infra
notes 117-59 and accompanying text.
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Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations.12 Lastly, Section V attempts to discern the future direction of the SEC’s climate disclosure policy, with Section VI
concluding the Comment.13
II. COOLING DOWN: A BACKGROUND TO
DISCLOSURE

THE

SEC

AND

CLIMATE

Familiarization with the SEC’s role in the securities industry
and the application of the materiality standard in securities law is
imperative to understanding securities disclosure.14 Likewise, understanding Regulation S-K is necessary to discuss disclosure requirements and to provide a backdrop for the recent S-K
amendments.15 Regulation S-K is simultaneously essential to dissecting the SEC’s 2010 guidance.16
A. The SEC and Materiality
In response to the 1929 stock market crash, which triggered a
total lack of public trust in markets, Congress enacted the Securities
Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act).17 The 1933 Act protects investors by requiring sellers to
provide financial information surrounding publicly-offered securities and by forbidding fraud or misrepresentation in the sale of securities.18 The 1934 Act created the SEC, a government regulatory
agency whose primary purpose is to ensure individuals selling secur12. For a discussion of the TCFD framework, see infra notes 160-85 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the future of SEC climate disclosure guidance, see
infra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the SEC’s creation and role, see infra notes 17-20 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the materiality standard, see infra notes 2126 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of Regulation S-K disclosure requirements, see infra notes
27-48 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the SEC’s interpretive guidance on climate disclosure
and Regulation S-K, see infra notes 71-116 and accompanying text.
17. The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/investing-basics/role-sec (last visited Jan. 9, 2021) (reviewing creation of
SEC); see The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, INVESTOR.GOV [hereinafter The
Laws That Govern], https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investingbasics/role-sec/laws-govern-securities-industry (last visited Nov. 13, 2021) (explaining principal sources of securities legislation).
18. See The Laws That Govern, supra note 17 (stating goals of 1933 Act). The
1933 Act achieves these goals via a registration process for securities sold in the
U.S. Id. (outlining registration process for domestic securities sales). Registration
forces sellers to disclose financial information, resulting in informed decision-making when purchasing securities. Id. (explaining purpose of registration).
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ities to the public disclose information surrounding possible investment risks.19 Nearly one hundred years later, the SEC maintains its
mission of guaranteeing investment information disclosure through
a nationwide network of offices that implement and enforce disclosure rules based on federal securities law.20
A central tenet of U.S. securities law is the concept of materiality.21 In the case of corporate disclosure, the SEC requires that entities issuing securities to the public disclose useful information that
informs prospective investors of potential risks.22 The issue with
this requirement, however, is the difficulty in determining what information is considered useful and, therefore, necessary to
disclose.23
In ferreting out useless information, legislators and, subsequently, the SEC introduced the concept of materiality into federal
securities law in the late 1930s.24 Information is material to an investment or shareholder voting decision if it enables the formation
of inferences that would substantially impact a reasonable investor
or shareholder’s decision-making process.25 Despite the existence
19. See id. (discussing SEC’s purpose).
20. John H. Matheson, Securities and Exchange Commission, MIDDLE TEN. ST. U.:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/
819/securities-and-exchange-commission (last visited Jan. 9, 2021) (describing
modern-day SEC).
21. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, THE MATERIALITY STANDARD FOR PUBLIC COMPANY DISCLOSURE: MAINTAIN WHAT WORKS 1 (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/
archive/reports/BRT.The%20Materiality%20Standard%20for%20Public%20
Company%20Disclosure.2015.10.29.pdf (introducing principle of materiality).
22. Id. (asserting federal securities law requirements); see also EVA SU, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., IF11256, SEC SECURITIES DISCLOSURE: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES
1 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11256 (discussing
disclosure requirements).
23. See Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of “Materiality” Under U.S.
Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 663-64 (2004) (arguing materiality is elusive concept); see also SU, supra note 22, at 2 (reviewing numerous policy
issues associated with disclosure). Disclosure poses various issues ranging from the
quality to the frequency of disclosure. Id. (listing disclosure policy issues). Over
the last few years, policy debates surrounding disclosure have focused on information overload — concern over companies providing investors with too much information. Id. (suggesting correlation between rising disclosure requirements and
investors’ difficulty in finding pertinent information).
24. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 21, at 3 (referencing introduction of materiality in securities law).
25. See Lee, supra note 23, at 662-64 (defining materiality standard); see also
TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (providing standard to
measure materiality of investment information). Although the TSC standard attempts to clarify what information a corporation must disclose, critics argue the
standard is somewhat elusive, balancing on the definition of a “reasonable investor” and the various contextual situations in which the standard may apply. See
Lee, supra note 23, at 664, 663-65 (discussing issues with standard).
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of a materiality standard, both the complexity of modern capital
markets and the interconnectedness of the global economy lead
many to believe the standard can only be applied retroactively.26
B. Regulation S-K Disclosure Requirements
The 1930s securities legislation not only introduced registration requirements, but also dictated the type of information companies must disclose to shareholders.27 Of the many regulations the
1933 Act implemented, Regulations S-K and S-X deal primarily with
corporate disclosure.28 Regulation S-X governs the form and content of required financial statement disclosure.29 In comparison,
Regulation S-K focuses on a broad range of information such as
proxy statements, periodic reports, and other filings required
under the 1933 Act.30
Regulation S-K is separated into fourteen subparts governing
securities disclosure requirements under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, as
well as the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA).31
These subparts include disclosures related to mergers and acquisitions, asset-backed securities, and management.32 Subparts requiring disclosure related to a registrant’s oil production or mining
activities are derived from the EPCA.33
By its nature, Regulation S-K presents the most advantageous
vehicle for the institution of a standardized climate disclosure
26. See Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform — The SEC Is Riding Off in Two
Directions at Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781, 787, 789 (2016) (reviewing history of complex
SEC-required disclosures); see also Lee, supra note 23 (suggesting difficulties exist
in applying materiality standard).
27. ALEXANDER F. COHEN ET AL., LATHAM & WATKINS, FINANCIAL STATEMENT
REQUIREMENTS IN U.S. SECURITIES OFFERINGS 1 (2021), https://www.lw.com/
thoughtLeadership/us-financial-statements-guide (distinguishing Regulations S-K
and S-X).
28. Id. (outlining 1933 Act’s disclosure requirements).
29. Id. at 1-2 (differentiating S-X from S-K). See generally Form and Content of
and Requirements for Financial Statements, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2021) (specifying requirements for form and content of financial statements).
30. Glossary: Regulation S-K, THOMSON REUTERS (last visited Jan. 10, 2020)
(describing S-K). See generally Standard Instructions for Filing Forms Under Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2021) (listing required disclosures under S-K).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 229 (providing subparts of S-K).
32. Id. §§ 229.400, 229.1000, 229.1100 (categorizing certain disclosure requirements).
33. Id. §§ 229.1200, 229.1300 (requiring disclosure of mining and oil producing operations); see Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6383 (requiring SEC creation of disclosure policy related to energy production). See generally
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Energy_Policy_and_Conservation_Act_of_1975 (last visited Jan. 1, 2021) (providing background on EPCA).
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framework.34 Specifically, commentators and the SEC have identified four items in Regulation S-K most relevant to climate disclosure.35 These items are: Item 101 (Description of Business); Item
103 (Legal Proceedings); Item 303 (Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations); and
Item 105 (Risk Factors), formerly Item 503(c).36
Item 101 (Description of Business) requires registrants to disclose information and discuss the primary business behind the security for sale.37 A description of business disclosure must include a
discussion on the development of the business.38 This discussion
may cover a range of topics, including material changes to business
strategy, information on revenue generating activities, or the impact of government regulation.39
Item 103 (Legal Proceedings) requires registrants to disclose
material legal proceedings that extend beyond routine litigation.40
The SEC suggests that bankruptcy, registrant directors or affiliates
acting as an adverse party in litigation, or a proceeding material to
the registrant’s finances also represent material legal proceedings.41 Item 103 describes proceedings that generally do not require disclosure, including damage suits not exceeding ten percent
of assets and negligence claims considered an ordinary result of the
registrant’s business.42
Item 303 (Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A)) dictates that a registrant must provide managerial discussion relating to financial data

34. Rick E. Hansen, Climate Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants: Revisiting the
SEC’s 2010 Interpretive Release, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 487, 492 (2012)
(examining SEC climate disclosure guidance).
35. SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6295 (referencing relevant S-K subparts);
see Hansen, supra note 34, at 492-95 (discussing relevant S-K subparts).
36. SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6293-95 (reviewing relevant regulations).
37. Regulation S-K, Item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2021) (stating business
description requirements).
38. Practical Law Corporate & Securities, Registration Statement: Form S-1, THOMSON REUTERS [hereinafter Practical Law Corporate & Securities] (last visited Jan. 16,
2021) (providing background on Item 101 disclosure).
39. Id. (suggesting various materials that can be discussed in Item 101
disclosure).
40. Regulation S-K, Item 103, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2021) (calling for description of material legal proceedings); SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6293 (describing typical Item 103 disclosures).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103(c) (listing potential material legal proceedings).
42. Id. § 229.103(b) (describing non-material legal proceedings).
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typically found in financial statements and annual reports.43 In
Item 303, the SEC requires discussion of any information a registrant believes is necessary to understand the financial status of its
business fully, as well as any “changes in financial condition and
results of operations” from previous disclosures.44 The SEC specifically dictates that businesses must disclose information illuminating
topics such as a liquidity, capital resources, and operational
results.45
Lastly, Item 105 (Risk Factors) requires that, wherever appropriate, a registrant discuss “material factors that make an investment in the registrant or offering speculative or risky.”46 The
discussion must detail how each risk can potentially affect the registrant’s securities.47 Risks discussed should be specific to the registrant’s business, and any risk deemed generic — as in it applies to a
broad group of registrants — need not be discussed.48
C. SEC’s 2010 Interpretive Guidance on Climate Change
Instead of creating a standardized disclosure regime, the SEC
approached climate disclosure through interpretive guidance intended to clarify the type of disclosure that should naturally occur
under existing regulations.49 This interpretive guidance can be
traced back to growing investor demand for climate disclosure in
the early 2000s.50 The SEC answered this demand in 2010 with interpretive guidance intended to provide investors with consistency
in registrant reporting of climate-related material.51
43. Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2021) (providing information regarding required discussion relating to financial condition); Hansen, supra
note 34, at 494 (summarizing Item 303).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (describing requirements for full fiscal year
disclosures).
45. Id. § 229.303(b)(1)-(5) (listing required information for disclosure under
Item 303).
46. Regulation S-K, Item 105, 17 C.F.R. § 229.105(a) (2021) (requiring discussion of risk factors in disclosure).
47. Id. (discussing risk potential).
48. Id. (reviewing required risks to disclose under Item 105); Practical Law
Corporate & Securities, supra note 38 (providing background on updated Risk Factors disclosure).
49. For a further discussion of the SEC’s 2010 guidance, see infra notes 71-104
and accompanying text.
50. For a further discussion of investors pressuring the SEC, see infra notes
52-70 and accompanying text.
51. For a further discussion of the SEC’s 2010 guidance, see infra notes 71-104
and accompanying text.
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Demanding Change

By the mid-2000s, climate scientists warned the public of the
inevitable, long-term consequences associated with climate
change.52 The scientific community argued that observable change
in climate had already arrived in the form of rising sea levels and
temperatures, as well as decreases in global snow and ice levels.53
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
released the Fourth National Climate Assessment report for global
policymakers.54 This report echoed the bleak message of climate
scientists everywhere — without mitigating action, climate change
will continue with devastating consequences.55
Although the IPCC’s report targeted global policy makers, its
prediction of the planet’s dire future resonated with a broader audience.56 The science of climate change became impossible for
business leaders and investors to ignore.57 Thus, the mid-2000s
presented a growing awareness among investors of the climate-related financial risks and opportunities businesses face across economic sectors and geographic borders.58
In 2007, a group of twenty-two institutional investors, state treasurers, and environmental activist groups submitted a petition to
the SEC requesting climate risk disclosure guidance.59 The petition
argued that climate change produces concrete investment risks and
opportunities of which registrants possess material information.60
The petitioners asserted that despite registrants’ awareness of this
52. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 2 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2008), https://
www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf (suggesting
warming climate is unequivocal).
53. Id. (discussing observable impacts of changing climate over one-hundredyear period).
54. See generally id. (reporting changes in climate and suggesting actions to
halt further change).
55. Id. at 19 (listing risks associated with changing climate).
56. PETITION FOR INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE, SEC
FILE NO. 4-547, at 6 (Sept. 18, 2007) [hereinafter SEC PETITION], https://
www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf (referencing IPCC’s Fourth National Climate Assessment report).
57. See generally id. at 7 (suggesting impacts of climate change implicate business and investment).
58. Id. at 6-7 (asserting both risks and gains are associated with climate
change).
59. Id. at 2-3 (stating reasons for petition); John M. Broder, SEC Adds Climate
Risk to Disclosure List, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/
01/28/business/28sec.html (describing petitions influencing creation of climate
risk disclosure guidance).
60. See SEC PETITION, supra note 56, at 2, 21 (describing climate risks registrants face).
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information, disclosures failed to provide investors with relevant information surrounding climate risk.61 Petitioners highlighted the
increasing importance of this area to investors by emphasizing the
climate risks public companies face, including changing regulatory,
physical, and economic environments.62 The petition, therefore,
suggested that if the SEC is to uphold its mandate of ensuring securities market efficiency through disclosure, then it must address
climate change.63
Instituting clear disclosure guidelines relating to climate is easier said than done.64 From the mid-1990s to 2009, the SEC’s track
record for obtaining material climate-related information can only
be described as dismal.65 By 2008, just two years before the release
of the interpretive guidance, only 5.5 percent of S&P 500 companies identified climate change as posing a strategic business risk in
yearly disclosures.66
Despite the SEC’s poor record of climate disclosure and the
growing demand for material information, the Commission’s decision to issue the interpretive guidance instead of amending Regulation S-K demonstrated internal hesitation to create definite
disclosure requirements.67 In a January 2010 meeting convened to
discuss the guidance, Commissioners expressed concerns that the
guidance would be interpreted as the SEC “taking a position” on
climate change.68 One Commissioner even questioned the productivity of the guidance, suggesting it only provides investors with useless information.69 Notwithstanding these criticisms, Commissioners voted in favor of issuing the guidance.70
61. See id. at 2, 45-48 (asserting lack of transparency regarding climate-related
disclosure).
62. Id. at 21-22 (reviewing major climate risks).
63. See id. at 2 (suggesting disclosure leads to efficient markets).
64. See generally Hansen, supra note 34, at 508-10 (describing climate-related
disclosure prior to 2010).
65. See id. at 509-10 (highlighting Form 10-K filings for S&P registrants between 1995 and 2008).
66. Id. (restating 2009 study on S&P registrants and climate disclosure); Kevin
L. Doran & Elis L. Quinn, Climate Change Risk Disclosure: A Sector by Sector Analysis of
SEC 10-K Filings from 1995-2008, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. 721, 726 (2009) (studying climate-related disclosures prior to 2010).
67. See SEC Issues Interpretive Guidance on Climate Change Disclosures, GIBSON
DUNN (Feb. 4, 2010), https://www.gibsondunn.com/sec-issues-interpretive-guidance-on-climate-change-disclosures/#_ftn2 (discussing Commissioners’ deliberations on topic).
68. Id. (referencing dissenting Commissioners’ worries).
69. Id. (highlighting Commissioner Troy Paredes’s issue with guidance).
70. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Interpretive Guidance on Disclosure Related to Business or Legal Developments Regarding Cli-
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Working With What We Have: The SEC’s Interpretive Guidance

Upon releasing the 2010 interpretive guidance, the SEC clarified that securities laws and regulations were not changing.71 The
interpretive guidance’s introduction declares it is only meant to “assist companies in satisfying their disclosure obligations under the
[existing] federal securities laws and regulations.”72 The guidance
suggests, rather than requires, that registrants consider climate impacts when addressing Items 101, 103, 303, and 105 of Regulation SK.73 Although approaching climate disclosure in this manner
might have been the most feasible option at the time, the SEC’s
failure to provide concrete regulations likely contributed to the
lackluster performance of the interpretive guidance throughout the
2010s.74
In the interpretive guidance, the SEC first points to Item 101 as
requiring climate-related disclosures.75 The SEC suggests that Item
101 already requires companies to disclose the costs of complying
with environmental laws.76 Next, the SEC points to Item 103 disclosures.77 The SEC again highlights environmental discussions, as
Item 103 requires disclosure of litigation presenting potential monetary sanctions, expenditures, or deferred charges exceeding ten
percent of a registrant’s current assets.78 The interpretive guidance
then turns to Item 105.79 Unlike the discussion of previous items,
the SEC does not point to specific environmental requirements embedded in Item 105 concerning risk factors.80
Lastly, in its review of relevant Regulation S-K subparts, the interpretive guidance provides an in-depth discussion of the requirements under Item 303’s MD&A section.81 In this section, the SEC
implies that the MD&A requirement is inherently flexible, compelmate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-15.htm
(reviewing reasoning supporting passage of guidance).
71. Id. (stating guidance does not modify legal requirements).
72. SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6290 (summarizing guidance).
73. See id. at 6293-95 (explaining how S-K disclosure requirements cover climate-related disclosures).
74. For a further discussion of the impact of the SEC’s 2010 guidance, see
infra notes 117-59 and accompanying text.
75. SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6293 (discussing description of business
relation to climate disclosure).
76. Id. (emphasizing Item 101 requirements).
77. Id. (referencing environmental disclosures under Item 101).
78. Id. at 6293-94 (reviewing Item 103).
79. Id. at 6294 (explaining Item 105).
80. See SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6294 (refraining from suggesting environmental requirements associated with Item 105).
81. Id. (discussing Item 303).
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ling registrants to disclose new information based on evolving business trends.82 The Commission notes that MD&A disclosure
generally relates to liquidity and capital resources created through
business operations and that registrants should work to identify and
disclose material trends, events, or commitments that may impact
these areas going forward.83
After identifying specific parts of Regulation S-K, the interpretive guidance attempts to link climate-related disclosures to these
areas.84 The SEC indicates that “[d]epending on the facts and circumstances of a particular registrant,” the previously-summarized
Regulation S-K items may require specific climate disclosures.85
The Commission envisions four possible situations in which Regulation S-K triggers climate disclosure.86
First, the Commission connects the impact of possible environmental legislation and regulations to Items 101, 103, 105, and
303.87 The SEC’s primary argument is that relevant legislation or
regulation has material financial impact on registrants.88 From
costs associated with “cap and trade systems” to changes surrounding profit and loss margins related to climate legislation or regulations, the SEC asserts Items 101, 103, 303, and 105 may all be
implicated.89
Similarly, the interpretive guidance mentions the effects of international climate accords on registrants.90 The SEC suggests that
international accords related to climate may lead to disclosure requirements similar to those triggered by domestic legislation and
regulation.91 In an attempt to illustrate an international agreement
impacting registrants across a broad spectrum of industries, the interpretive guidance references established international accords
such as the Kyoto Protocol.92
82. Id. (asserting MD&A naturally calls for climate disclosure).
83. Id. at 6294-95 (reviewing typical MD&A disclosures).
84. Id. (providing examples of climate-related information that may be required for disclosure).
85. SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6295 (introducing possible climate topics
requiring disclosure).
86. Id. (highlighting possible disclosure requirements).
87. See id. at 6295-96 (explaining impacts of environmental legislation under
S-K).
88. Id. (focusing SEC argument on legislation).
89. Id. at 6296 (listing consequences of regulation or legislation).
90. See SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6296 (introducing prospect of disclosure related to international accords).
91. Id. (suggesting impact of international treaties on business operations).
92. Id. (referencing Kyoto Protocol).
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After identifying how domestic and international regulations
may impact registrants’ disclosure duties, the interpretive guidance
adds that the indirect consequences of such regulation or development of business trends may lead to further disclosure requirements.93 Here, the SEC emphasizes the broad market demand for
new products and services or potential decreases in demand for
older ones.94 The interpretive guidance implies that due to climate
change, there are both opportunities and risks in shifting market
demands that investors should be aware of.95 The SEC asserts that
Items 303 and 105 could help to illuminate such opportunities.96
The Commission also notes some business developments are so significant that Item 101 may warrant disclosure as well.97 The interpretive guidance does not, however, provide an example of a
climate-related scenario that could trigger a change in a registrant’s
core business, thereby prompting Item 101 disclosure.98
Lastly, the interpretive guidance focuses on how the physical
impacts of climate change may trigger disclosure requirements.99
Here, the SEC advances Item 105 as the appropriate vehicle for registrants and discusses the effects of severe weather on business operations.100 In identifying the link between severe weather and
business risk, the interpretive guidance references a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report proposing that the number of
severe weather events brought on by climate change will continue
to grow and present major risks to registrant property like factories
and distribution centers.101 The SEC encourages registrants to
identify weather risks posed in individual regions where the registrant conducts business.102 Such risks may include areas prone to
coastal flooding and hurricanes, as well as areas more susceptible to
93. Id. (introducing indirect consequences of regulation or business trends as
possible disclosure requirement).
94. Id. (highlighting how climate change influences demand).
95. SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6296 (suggesting both risks and opportunities are present).
96. Id. (listing S-K sections best suited to handle issues).
97. Id. (suggesting Item 101 requires disclosure).
98. Id. (noting Item 101 disclosure includes significant impact on business
operations).
99. Id. at 6296-97 (introducing physical impacts of climate change requiring
disclosure).
100. See SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6297 (referencing severe weather as
major risk factor for businesses).
101. Id. (noting severe weather’s impact on property).
102. Id. (listing potential weather risks based on business operation
locations).
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drought conditions.103 Once identified, registrants should disclose
the potential consequences of these weather-related events to
investors.104
3.

Regulation S-K Amendments

More than ten years after its publication, the SEC’s 2010 guidance remains unchanged.105 Over this period, however, the SEC
actively updated other regulations.106 In particular, the SEC
adopted a slew of amendments to Regulation S-K at the end of
2020.107
These amendments target Regulation S-K subparts Items 101,
103, 303, and 105, which the 2010 guidance references as the most
relevant regulations for increasing climate disclosure.108 In a press
release following the amendments’ adoption, the SEC declared that
modernization was the driving force behind the amendments.109
These amendments introduced a variety of changes, particularly in
MD&A requirements.110 As the SEC has not introduced significant
changes in nearly thirty years, the amendments present a major
shift in disclosure requirements.111
One amendment to Item 101(c) requires registrants to expand
evaluation and reporting of human capital.112 The amendment re103. Id. (highlighting flooding and droughts).
104. Id. (asserting disclosure is next step after identifying material risks).
105. See generally SEC Guidance, supra note 7, at 6290-97 (providing last SECissued guidance relating to climate disclosure).
106. See Valerie Jacob et. al., New Wave of Regulation S-K Amendments, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 22, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2020/12/22/new-wave-of-regulation-s-k-amendments/ (reviewing recentlyadopted S-K amendments).
107. Id. (citing S-K amendments adopted in November and August of 2020).
108. See Valerie Jacob et al., SEC Changes Rules Affecting Risk Factors, Litigation
and Business Description Disclosures by U.S. Public Companies, FRESHFIELDS (Aug. 27,
2020), https://blog.freshfields.us/post/102ge4p/sec-changes-rules-affecting-riskfactors-litigation-and-business-description-dis (listing recent changes to S-K).
109. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule Amendments to Modernize Disclosures of Business, Legal Proceedings, and Risk Factors
Under Regulation S-K (Aug. 26, 2020) [hereinafter SEC Adopts Rule Amendments], https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-192 (providing reasoning
behind amendments).
110. Jacob et al., supra note 108 (discussing risk alterations to MD&A
requirements).
111. See SEC Adopts Rule Amendments, supra note 109 (stating lack of update
in nearly thirty years).
112. Elizabeth Bieber et al., Practical Insights Into Incorporating New Human Capital Management Disclosures Into a Company’s Annual Reports on Form 10-K,
FRESHFIELDS (Oct. 9, 2020), https://blog.freshfields.us/post/102ghzx/practical-insights-into-incorporating-new-human-capital-management-disclosures-in (discussing amendments to Item 101(c)).
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quires registrants to provide a description of their human capital
resources if doing so would give investors a better understanding of
the registrants’ business.113 Interestingly, this topic gained traction
with the SEC in a similar manner to that of late-2000s climate disclosure — by investor demand.114 Institutional investors used open
letters and other modes of public communication to draw SEC and
registrant attention to human capital issues such as workplace diversity.115 Unlike the previous demand for codified climate disclosure
requirements, human capital disclosures found a way into the recent Regulation S-K amendments.116
III. THE COLD STREAK CONTINUES: ASSESSING
OF THE 2010 GUIDANCE

THE

EFFECTIVENESS

Under the recent Regulation S-K amendments, the SEC’s emphasis on enhancing human capital disclosures provides hope that
other environmental, social, and governance (ESG) topics may one
day have distinct disclosure requirements.117 These amendments,
however, also raise questions about the current state of climate disclosure; specifically, whether the 2010 guidance effectively produces material information related to climate that warrants
completely bypassing the opportunity to create enhanced climate
disclosure requirements via Regulation S-K’s 2020 amendments.118
An assessment of climate disclosure over the last ten years suggests
the answer to that question is no.119
A. More of the Same: Another Decade of Inadequate Disclosure
Although socially-conscious investors and climate advocates initially celebrated the publication of the 2010 guidance, it appears to
have brought little change to the disclosure landscape.120 In a re113. Id. (summarizing amendment).
114. See id. (illustrating demand initiating SEC action).
115. Id. (referencing institutional investor work on human capital disclosure).
116. Id. (discussing human capital requirements); SEC Adopts Rule Amendments, supra note 109 (explaining human capital requirements).
117. See ASSET MGMT. ADVISORY COMM., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESG 1-2 (July 7, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/files/amac-recommendations-esg-subcommittee-070721.pdf (recommending ESG disclosure
standards).
118. For a further discussion of the effectiveness of the SEC’s 2010 guidance,
see infra notes 120-59 and accompanying text.
119. For a further discussion of the investor reaction to and effectiveness of
the interpretive guidance, see infra notes 120-59 and accompanying text.
120. See Alan R. Palmiter, Climate Change Disclosure: A Failed SEC Mandate
19-21 (Mar. 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2639181 (discussing immediate reaction to 2010 interpretive guidance).
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port to Congress four years after the guidance’s release, the SEC
admitted no notable changes in the quality of climate-related disclosures had occurred since the guidance’s inception.121 In the
same report, SEC senior staff suggest the 2010 guidance will not
produce major shifts from generic climate disclosure that frequented 10-Ks prior to 2010.122
Despite the SEC’s bleak review, there has been an increase in
the quantity of climate disclosure since the interpretive guidance’s
publication.123 Over the last ten years, the amount of climate-related disclosures has increased significantly.124 In an attempt to
measure yearly increases or decreases in climate-related disclosures,
organizations like Ceres and the TCFD search hundreds of annual
reports for references to climate.125 In a 2020 survey of 10-K filings,
sixty percent of surveyed registrants referenced climate change — a
sixteen percent increase from 2010.126 Although this increase
seems impressive from the outside, the algorithms used to identify
climate-related information search for extremely broad terms, such
as “flooding” or “hurricane”; these terms are likely used in contexts
outside of any material discussion involving climate and the registrant’s business.127 As such, forty percent of registrants surveyed
evidently do not mention sufficiently broad topics to be flagged by
the algorithms as discussing climate, let alone discussing the transitional and physical risks investors hope to see in 10-Ks.128
121. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-188, CLIMATE-RELATED RISKS:
SEC HAS TAKEN STEPS TO CLARIFY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (2018), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-188.pdf (reviewing SEC’s climate disclosure efforts).
122. Id. at 15 (discussing SEC’s view of 2010 guidance).
123. See Parker Bolstad et al., Flying Blind: What Do Investors Really Know About
Climate Change Risks in the U.S. Equity and Municipal Debt Markets? 3 (Brookings,
Working Paper No. 67, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2020/09/WP67_Victor-et-al.pdf (asserting large volume of climate disclosure).
124. Id. (stating volume of disclosures increased over last ten years).
125. Id. at 5 (describing climate disclosure documentation outside entities
conducted).
126. Id. at 6 (depicting increase in registrants mentioning climate change in
yearly filings).
127. Id. at 5 (explaining how Ceres and TCFD survey registrants).
128. Bolstad et al., supra note 123, at 5-6 (highlighting that even with algorithmic bias, forty percent of registrants fail to mention anything about climate);
see Climate Change: What Are the Risks to Financial Stability?, BANK OF ENGLAND, https:/
/www.bankofengland.co.uk/knowledgebank/climate-change-what-are-the-risks-tofinancial-stability (last visited June 6, 2021) (describing physical and transitional
risks). Physical risks represent weather events that impact industries or entire
economies, whereas transition risks represent risks associated with shifts toward a
carbon-free economy, such as regulatory impacts and industry-specific obsolescence. Id. (explaining different physical and transitional risks).
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Although some stakeholders may celebrate the increased quantity of disclosure, this solves little without a similar increase in the
quality of disclosure.129 A majority of the disclosure released provides investors with generic, boilerplate information surrounding
climate risk and opportunities.130 Registrants consistently fail to
disclose risks beyond general statements.131 For example, Exxon
Mobil’s 2019 disclosure states that climate change “could make our
products more expensive, less competitive, lengthen project implementation times, and reduce demand for hydrocarbons.”132
An Ernst & Young report on climate disclosure highlights the
difference between the quality and quantity of disclosure.133 The
report surveyed over 950 companies, assessing the quality of registrant disclosure based on governance, strategy, and risk management related to climate issues and finding that on average, the
quality of climate disclosure graded at about twenty-seven percent.134 The report asserts that although companies are increasingly discussing climate in their disclosures, they fail to reference
climate change’s impact on business operations.135
Furthermore, disclosure quality also appears to vary highly between industries.136 Industries most exposed to the transitional risk
associated with climate change — energy, banking, and transportation — provide the overall highest quality and quantity of disclosure.137 Between 2009 and 2017, gas and electric utility companies’
disclosures provided more than fifty percent of all climate risk dis129. See Bolstad et al., supra note 123, at 3-4 (stating disclosed information has
no utility).
130. See id. (claiming climate disclosure remains generic); MADISON CONDON
ET AL., ENV’T DEF. FUND, MANDATING DISCLOSURE OF CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL
RISK 2 (2021), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Mandating_Climate_
Risk_Financial_Disclosures.pdf (emphasizing poor quality of disclosures).
131. See Michael Panfil, The SEC Should Require Companies to Disclose Climate
Change Risk, SLATE (Dec. 24, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://slate.com/technology/
2020/12/sec-climate-change-financial-risk-disclosure.html (providing generic climate disclosures).
132. Id. (discussing generic disclosures).
133. Mathew Nelson, How Can Climate Change Disclosures Protect Reputation and
Value?, EY (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.ey.com/en_gl/climate-change-sustainability-services/how-can-climate-change-disclosures-protect-reputation-and-value (suggesting limited progress on climate-related disclosures).
134. Id. (discussing climate information quality).
135. Id. (concluding registrants are unsure how to discuss climate impact).
136. See id. (asserting certain industries provide higher-quality climate disclosures).
137. Id. (reviewing performance based on industry); see Bolstad et al., supra
note 123, at 8 (depicting disclosure emphasis in select industries).
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cussion.138 Such high-quality disclosure is characteristic of these industries and is likely due to fossil fuel exposure, energy investment,
and stringent government regulation.139
Even high-quality disclosure is silent on many important climate-related topics, like the physical risks of climate change.140 No
matter the industry, climate disclosures emphasize transition risks
over physical risks.141 Transition risks highlight change brought on
by shifts to a low-carbon economy as well as changing government
policies.142 Although it is unclear why registrants seem to accentuate transition risks over physical risks, legislative pressures and litigation have subjected transition risks to a higher level of scrutiny.143
With the growing physical impact of climate change, however, it is
difficult to argue that transition risks pose any greater threat than
physical risks.144 Without providing an analysis of the physical climate risks a registrant faces, climate disclosures will remain filled
with gaps and difficult to utilize.145
B. Keeping No One in Check: Minimal SEC Enforcement
Perpetuates Lack of Disclosure
The SEC has done little to enforce disclosure of information
the 2010 guidance intended to produce.146 Within the first seven
years of the guidance’s publication, the SEC did not bring a single
138. See Bolstad et al., supra note 123, at 9 (graphing disclosure by industry for
Russell 3000 companies).
139. Nelson, supra note 133 (explaining why certain industries are overrepresented).
140. See Bolstad et al., supra note 123, at 10-11 (dissecting disclosure quality
problem).
141. Id. (questioning registrants’ focus on transition risks); Nelson, supra note
133 (claiming physical risk disclosure falls behind transition risk disclosure).
142. Christian Bjørnæs, Transitional Risk, CICERO, https://cicero.oslo.no/
en/CF-transitional-risk#:~:text=transitional%20Risk,disruptions%20to%20busines
ses%20or%20assets.&text=this%20has%20different%20angles%3A%20changes,
carbon%20technologies%20and%20liability%20issues (last visited Feb. 12, 2021)
(defining transitional risks).
143. Bolstad et al., supra note 123, at 11 (presenting possible explanation for
focus on transition risks).
144. See id. (claiming physical risks are equally as important as transition
risks).
145. Nelson, supra note 133 (asserting major problem with disclosures).
146. See Letter from Ceres to The Honorable Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n 1-2 (July 20, 2016), https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/
Fact%20Sheets%20or%20misc%20files/Ceres%20Investor%20Letter%20SEC
%20Concept%20Release%207-20-16.pdf (suggesting SEC’s enforcement of interpretive guidance is insufficient and providing recommendations for improvement).
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enforcement action to support its guidance.147 The SEC also failed
to monitor climate-related disclosure closely over this period.148 In
2012, the SEC issued forty-nine comment letters to registrants requesting additional climate-related information.149 That number
dwindled to zero over the next three years.150 According to Ceres,
only six SEC comment letters mentioned climate or the 2010 guidance over the last four years.151 This pales in comparison to the
roughly 2,100 comment letters filed during the first nine months of
2018.152
In recent years, Trump-appointed Commissioners took aim at
increased calls for climate disclosure, hindering SEC enforcement
of the 2010 guidance.153 Commissioner Hester Peirce publicly denounced calls for increased climate disclosure as “public shaming”
of registrants based on “a frenzy of moral rectitude.”154 Although
less virulent than Peirce, former SEC Chairman Jay Clayton pushed
for continued use of the “principles-based” materiality standard, resisting calls for implementation of a standardized climate disclosure
regime.155
Disgruntled with lackluster disclosure, investors have attempted to police climate disclosure only for the SEC to act as a
147. Id. at 2 (referencing lack of SEC enforcement).
148. Condon et al., supra note 130, at 25 (citing lack of comment letters from
SEC).
149. Id. (emphasizing number of SEC comment letters).
150. Id. (stating SEC did not issue comment letters in 2013).
151. VEENA RAMANI, CERES, ADDRESSING CLIMATE AS A SYSTEMIC RISK 31 (2020),
https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/reports/2020-06/Financial%20Regulators%20FULL%20FINAL.pdf (reviewing number of letters issued between 2016
and 2020 and stating interpretive guidance “has been minimally enforced”).
152. Jessica McKeon & Olga Usvyatsky, A Look at Top SEC Comment Letter Issues
in 2018, AUDIT ANALYTICS (Dec. 4, 2018), https://blog.auditanalytics.com/a-lookat-top-sec-comment-letter-issues-in-2018/#:~:text=the%20number%20of%20SEC
%20comment,first%20nine%20months%20of%202017 (providing background on
comment letters SEC issued in 2018).
153. Condon, supra note 130, at 25 (reviewing issues with SEC enforcement of
interpretive guidance).
154. Id. (stating Commissioner Peirce’s view of climate disclosure).
155. Id. (providing Chairman Clayton’s perspective on climate disclosure); see
Spencer G. Feldman, The SEC Proposes a Philosophical Shift to Principles-Based Disclosure in Response to Increasingly Irrelevant, Outdated and Immaterial Information in Public
Filings, MARTINDALE (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.martindale.com/legal-news/article_olshan-frome-wolosky-llp_2519885.htm (explaining principles-based disclosure philosophy). Principles-based disclosure represents a system of disclosure
requirements that do not follow a hardline rule, but provide “concepts” for a company to self-identify what should be disclosed. Feldman, supra (describing principles-based disclosure).
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roadblock to that endeavor.156 Shareholder climate resolutions increasingly ask companies to provide additional information on
greenhouse gas reduction targets.157 These attempts to coerce
companies into providing climate-related disclosures frequently result in contested actions before the SEC.158 The SEC, however, regularly rules to block and dismiss these resolutions entirely.159
IV. A HOT TAKE: THE TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the SEC’s 2010 guidance is only seemingly successful
in its ability to increase the amount of climate-related disclosure,
the quantity of disclosure is only half the battle.160 Luckily enough,
the 2010 guidance is not the only available climate disclosure regime for U.S. public companies to follow.161 In 2015, the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) established the TCFD.162 The TCFD was created after global leaders and central bankers were awakened to the
reality that inadequate climate disclosure leaves investors in the
dark.163 The FSB tasked the TCFD with developing voluntary climate disclosure guidance that publicly traded companies could refer to in crafting their annual disclosures.164
In 2017, after two years of research and public engagement,
the TCFD published eleven recommendations regarding climate
disclosure.165 The FSB intended that the recommendations apply
156. Condon, supra note 130, at 25 (suggesting SEC actively blocks investor
climate proposals).
157. See David Hasemyer, Investors Worried About Climate Change Run into New
SEC Roadblocks, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (May 3, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/03052019/shareholder-resolution-climate-change-sec-challenge-micromanage-trump/ (referencing investor proxy requests for climate
disclosure).
158. Id. (stating almost two-thirds of resolutions energy and utility companies
filed in 2019 were contested before SEC).
159. Id. (suggesting SEC has failed to aid investors with disclosure challenges).
160. For a further discussion of the SEC’s 2010 guidance, see supra notes 49104 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion of the TCFD’s climate disclosure recommendations, see
infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
162. Condon, supra note 130, at 17 (discussing TCFD’s creation).
163. TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, 2020 STATUS REPORT
2 (2020) [hereinafter TCFD STATUS REPORT], https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/
uploads/P291020-1.pdf (noting TCFD’s founding purpose).
164. Id. (emphasizing TCFD’s purpose).
165. Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., TCFD Report Finds Encouraging Progress on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure, but Also Need for Further Progress
to Consider Financial Risks 2 (June 5, 2019) [hereinafter TCFD Report Finds Encouraging Progress], https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R050619.pdf
(highlighting 2017 rollout of TCFD Recommendations); see TASK FORCE ON CLI-
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across varying industries and legal jurisdictions.166 The TCFD built
the recommendations around four “thematic areas” consisting of
governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.167
These thematic areas replicate the major operating aspects of publicly traded companies, with recommendations integrated in corresponding operational areas.168
The subsequent recommendations vary in scope.169 Some recommendations are extremely broad, such as a recommendation
under governance stating, “Describe the board’s oversight of climate-related risks and opportunities.”170 Other recommendations
are significantly more pointed, such as the recommendation suggesting that a registrant “[d]escribe the resilience of the organization’s strategy, taking into consideration different climate-related
scenarios, including a 2°C or lower scenario.”171 Here, the TCFD
specifically recommends that a registrant discuss how they will not
only fare in global efforts to keep temperatures within 2°C of preindustrial levels, but also how they plan to aid in that effort.172
Such recommendations incorporate scenario analysis into registrant disclosure preparation.173 Scenario analysis is designed to
help registrants examine potential climate scenarios and assess how
they might impact the registrant’s business going forward.174 The
TCFD believes that incorporating forward-looking scenario analysis
into disclosure recommendations enables registrants to provide investors with thoroughly analyzed climate disclosure.175
Although the 2017 recommendations report is more in-depth
than the SEC’s climate disclosure guidance, it is still unclear
whether the TCFD recommendations are more effective in creating
MATE-RELATED

FIN. DISCLOSURES, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIFINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 14 (2017) [hereinafter TCFD RECOMMENDA
TIONS], https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/60/2020/10/FINAL-2017-TCFDReport-11052018.pdf (detailing recommendations for better communication of
climate-related financial information).
166. TCFD Report Finds Encouraging Progress, supra note 165 (explaining
eleven recommendations).
167. TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 165 (describing thematic areas).
168. Id. at 13 (stating how recommendations tie into thematic areas).
169. Id. at 14 (presenting recommendations).
170. Id. (suggesting recommendations related to governance).
171. Id. (listing disclosure recommendations related to strategy).
172. TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 165 at 14, 27 (integrating scenario
analysis into recommendation).
173. Id. at 25 (overviewing scenario analysis).
174. Id. at 25-26 (expounding on scenario analysis).
175. Id. at 25 (stating purpose underlying scenario analysis).
MATE-RELATED

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol33/iss1/2

20

Dunbar: The SEC's Ice-Cold Take on Climate Disclosure: Is the 2010 Interp

IS

THE

2010 INTERPRETIVE CLIMATE GUIDANCE WORKING?

57

material disclosure.176 Similar to the 2010 guidance, the 2017
TCFD recommendations have not triggered substantial growth in
the quality of climate-related disclosure.177 In its 2020 status report,
the TCFD declared that since the recommendations’ 2017 inception, the number of companies using the eleven recommended disclosure areas increased by six percent.178 The quantity increase,
however, did not translate to a significant improvement in the quality of disclosure within financial filings.179 The TCFD utilized artificial intelligence (AI) to research where companies were using the
disclosure recommendations most, finding the recommendations
were concentrated in sustainability reports and not official financial
disclosures.180 Unlike required financial filings, which are considered legally binding statements by a registrant, sustainability reporting is voluntary and meant to manage public perception of a
company rather than provide material information to investors.181
Although companies use the recommendations to pad sustainability reports with TCFD terminology, worries surrounding
business confidentiality and liability might be keeping registrants
from incorporating the TCFD recommendations into financial disclosures.182 In discussing recommendation implementation with
companies, the TCFD notes an often-cited issue is the worry that
scenario analysis might require disclosure of confidential business
information.183 Further, the TCFD study also noted that companies
struggled in identifying the appropriate metrics to use in determining which information is relevant to investors.184 To counter this
176. Compare TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 165 (providing detailed
suggestions regarding how registrants should approach climate disclosure), with
SEC Guidance, supra note 7 (publishing broad guidance utilizing existing
regulation).
177. See TCFD STATUS REPORT, supra note 163, at 4 (hinting quality of disclosure remains low).
178. Id. at 12 (suggesting increase of disclosure is related to recommendations).
179. See id. (stating more work is needed to increase climate-related disclosure).
180. Id. (noting companies apply majority of TCFD recommendations in sustainability reporting).
181. Chris Gaetano, Rise of Sustainability Reporting Brings Questions of Motivation, Agenda, NYSSCPA (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nysscpa.org/news/publications/the-trusted-professional/article/rise-of-sustainability-reporting-bringsquestions-of-motivation-agenda (asserting hidden intentions fuel sustainability
reporting).
182. TCFD STATUS REPORT, supra note 163, at 50 (citing confidentiality as issue in disclosure of material climate information).
183. Id. (highlighting fear of unnecessarily disclosing confidential business
information).
184. Id. at 50-51 (discussing issues with metrics and targets).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2022

21

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 2

58

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 33

issue, the TCFD merely notes that industries must develop their
own methods to measure climate-related issues in order to support
TCFD disclosure recommendations.185
V. THE FUTURE IS . . . COOLER? POSSIBLE MANDATORY CLIMATE
DISCLOSURE UNDER THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION
The TCFD recommendations’ limited success indicates
broader issues with climate disclosure beyond the SEC’s principlesbased guidance.186 Whether the issue is registrants’ failure to understand the impacts of climate change within their particular industries or the fear of public backlash linked with disclosure, it is
imperative that the SEC identifies a proper catalyst to ensure financial disclosure is fully utilized in the fight against climate change.187
After the SEC passed on an opportunity to create concrete disclosure requirements with the 2020 Regulation S-K amendments, however, there are significant doubts concerning the Commission’s
capability to tackle the climate disclosure problem moving
forward.188
The recent change in presidential administration may provide
hope for the future of climate disclosure efforts.189 The Trump administration tirelessly targeted environmental regulation over the
last four years.190 In terms of investing and financial disclosure, the
administration obstructed investors from seeking increased ESG
disclosure and placed limitations on ESG investment strategies pursued by asset managers.191 Now, however, with a newly inaugurated
185. Id. at 51 (suggesting industries must take lead on metrics and targets).
186. See id. at 4 (reviewing “success” of TCFD disclosure). For a further discussion of the SEC’s 2010 climate guidance, see supra notes 49-104 and accompanying text.
187. See Gaetano, supra note 181 (suggesting purpose behind including information in sustainability reports but not financial disclosure); see also SEC PETITION,
supra note 56, at 2 (referencing petition on importance of climate disclosure).
188. For a further discussion of the 2020 Regulation S-K Amendments, see
supra notes 105-16.
189. For a further discussion of potential changes to climate disclosure under
the Biden administration, see infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
190. See generally Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Rolled Back
More Than 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html (reviewing Trump administration’s impact on environmental
regulation).
191. See Jessica DiNapolo & Ross Kerber, Analysis: Sustainable Investing Advocates Hope for Friendlier U.S. Rules if Biden Wins, REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2020), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-biden-esg-analysis/analysis-sustainableinvesting-advocates-hope-for-friendlier-u-s-rules-if-biden-wins-idUSKBN27I1K1 (examining environmental disclosure under Trump).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol33/iss1/2

22

Dunbar: The SEC's Ice-Cold Take on Climate Disclosure: Is the 2010 Interp

IS

THE

2010 INTERPRETIVE CLIMATE GUIDANCE WORKING?

59

president accompanied by major personnel changes to key cabinet
positions, investors are hoping to push climate disclosure in a more
progressive direction.192
The reason for this optimism stems beyond the left’s track record on climate disclosure.193 During his run for the White House,
then-candidate Biden openly pledged to implement mandatory disclosure of climate risks and carbon emissions data.194 The Biden
administration identified mandatory climate disclosure as a key tool
to achieve the administration’s goal of net-zero greenhouse gas
emissions by 2050.195 Although it remains unclear what a prescriptive SEC approach to climate disclosure will look like, the administration signaled in a January 2021 executive order that it will
actively work to create a climate disclosure framework.196 Due to
the shift in SEC leadership composition to the ideological left, as
well as presidential support for mandatory disclosure, law firms are
now advising companies to prepare for new climate disclosure requirements in the near future.197
A possible approach to establishing mandatory climate disclosure, as seen by recent implementation in the United Kingdom,
proposes that the SEC make TCFD disclosure recommendations
mandatory.198 A mandatory disclosure requirement would help
192. See generally Benjamin D. Stone, During Biden Administration, SEC Will Require Climate Change Risk and ESG Disclosure, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 29, 2020), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/during-biden-administration-sec-will-require-climate-change-risk-and-esg-disclosure (suggesting Biden administration looks to pursue better climate disclosure).
193. Id. (referencing major ESG and climate disclosure legislation proposed
by Democrat-controlled Congress).
194. Esther Whieldon & Declan Harty, Biden Plan to Make Companies Disclose
Climate Risks Key to Decarbonization, S&P GLOB. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://
www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/
biden-plan-to-make-companies-disclose-climate-risks-key-to-decarbonization60975902 (discussing President Biden’s pledge to enhance climate disclosure).
195. Id. (suggesting 2050 goal is catalyst for mandatory climate disclosure).
196. Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619, 7622 (Feb. 1, 2021) (recommending plan to combat climate change with disclosure).
197. See Bob Pisani, What a Democrat-Controlled SEC Might Look Like and What it
Would Mean for Markets, CNBC (Nov. 12, 2020, 11:28 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/11/11/what-a-democrat-controlled-sec-might-look-like-and-what-it-wouldmean-for-markets.html (asserting Democrat-led SEC will create different regulatory environment). See generally The Biden Administration: New Priorities in the Banking, Fintech and Derivatives Sectors, GIBSON DUNN (Feb. 16, 2021), https://
www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/the-biden-administrationnew-priorities-in-the-banking-fintech-and-derivatives-sectors.pdf (predicting disclosure trend under Biden administration).
198. Laura Tyson, Joe Biden Must Take a Global Lead on Climate Risk Disclosure,
SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD. (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.sasb.org/blog/
joe-biden-must-take-a-global-lead-on-climate-risk-disclosure-financial-times/ (refer-
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regulators produce consistent and comparable climate disclosure
based on pre-established frameworks; all regulators would need to
do is act as the enforcement mechanism.199 Another suggested solution points to revisiting the 2010 guidance with the intention of
updating and possibly building mandatory rules to support the guidance.200 Regardless of which path the Biden administration takes
concerning disclosure, enforcement is critical in ensuring companies produce material climate information.201
VI. CONCLUSION: DISCLOSING

FOR A

COOLER PLANET

Whatever the future of climate disclosure, regulators cannot
rely on old formulas.202 Ill-defined requirements, coupled with
lacking regulatory enforcement, have contributed significantly to
the stagnation of growth in quality climate disclosure.203 Although
voluntary regimes such as the TCFD and other ESG disclosure initiatives arguably provide a clearer pathway to material disclosure,
the last decade suggests registrants may need more than the mere
recommendations voluntary regimes provide.204 Hopefully, the recent reshuffling in Washington, D.C. and growing investor demand
will provide the proper stimulant for better climate disclosure.205
Although disclosure itself may not solve climate change, the result-

encing recent U.K. actions involving TCFD disclosure); U.S. COMMODITY & FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, MANAGING CLIMATE RISK IN THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM
132-33 (2020), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/9-9-20%20Report%20of%20the%20Subcommittee%20on%20Climate-Related%20Market
%20Risk%20-%20Managing%20Climate%20Risk%20in%20the%20U.S.%20Financial%20System%20for%20posting.pdf (suggesting SEC incorporate TCFD recommendations into federal climate disclosure policy).
199. See U.S. COMMODITY & FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 198, at 13233 (emphasizing TCFD disclosure principles and enforcement).
200. Id. (discussing revisiting 2010 guidance as possible solution).
201. Id. (referencing enforcement).
202. For a further discussion of the SEC’s approach to climate disclosure, see
supra notes 49-104 and accompanying text.
203. For a further discussion of the SEC’s climate disclosure oversight, see
supra notes 117-59 and accompanying text.
204. For a further discussion of the SEC’s interpretive guidance, see supra
notes 160-84 and accompanying text.
205. For a further discussion of investor demand, see supra notes 52-70 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of possible Biden administration
changes, see supra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
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ing transparency undoubtedly creates a market that works to save
the planet.206
Patrick Dunbar*
206. For a further discussion of the benefits of climate disclosure, see supra
notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A., Political Science, 2015, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. To my
family and friends - thank you for the love and support.
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